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ABSTRACT
This article probes the classic definition of religious aesthetics as related to the notions of beauty, 
goodness and truth. The phenomenon of kitsch, understood as simulation (or inversion) of 
beauty, goodness and truth, is taken cognisance of, especially in the light of contributions by 
Milan Kundera, Umberto Eco and Jean Baudrillard. The article briefly reflects on the liturgical 
consequences when kitsch manifests itself as simulated ‘beauty’, ‘goodness’ and ‘truth’ and 
concludes with some considerations regarding the characteristics of kitsch.
AESTHETICS: THE INTERPLAY OF BEAUTY, GOODNESS AND TRUTH?
The unique relationship between art and theology has been debated extensively, especially since the 
eighties of the previous century.1 In terms of liturgy it has been pointed out that factors such as the 
anthropological basis of aesthetics (humans being created as being creative, having a neuro-cognitive 
capacity for imagination), the rediscovery of our bodileness, the upsurge of a culture of images and the 
imaginative mode of biblical texts all call for a rediscovery of the aesthetical dimensions of worship. It 
could indeed be said that liturgy – theology – cannot, and should not, be undertaken without a sound 
understanding of aesthetics (cf. Cillers 2007:55–78).
It is, however, not that easy to describe or define aesthetics as such, just as it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to define art. To reach an understanding of theological aesthetics proves to be an even more difficult task, 
given its distinctive understandings of beauty and (as) ugliness. Perhaps the classic understanding of the 
modes of God’s revelation and therefore presence amongst us still offers the best vocabulary for this 
endeavour. It was Hans Urs von Balthasar (1982:30) who, especially during the 20th century, placed the 
concept of beauty back on the theological agenda. He argued that the praxis of God’s presence among us, 
revealed in certain embodied encounters, is one of beauty. But what is meant by this? 
Beauty is, of course, a classic aesthetical concept that had been brought into conjunction with God’s 
revelation by theologians from the very beginning of Christianity. Classical thinkers such as Augustine 
and Aquinas, furthermore, categorised beauty alongside goodness and truth as being part and parcel 
of God’s revelation to us, indeed as a perfect unity of beauty, goodness and truth (cf. Pastro 2005:56). 
Consequently,
Beauty, truth and goodness can never be separated. It is questionable whether we can ever know one except 
in intimate connection with the others…. There is a truth – a reality, an authenticity – about beauty and 
goodness. There is goodness – a wholesomeness, salutariness, sacredness – about both beauty and truth. There 
is beauty in truth – in its self-evidence, its simplicity, its transparency – and in goodness, especially in the 
comeliness of moral character. 
(Avis 1999:78–79) 
In my opinion, religious aesthetics could be understood within this dynamic interplay between 
beauty, goodness and truth. Where these dimensions of God’s revelation coincide, an aesthetical event 
is constituted. And vice versa, where this interaction is compromised, aesthetics as such is shattered 
(German: verkitschen) and, in effect, superficialised. Then beauty becomes sentimentality, truth 
generalisations and goodness moral domestication. This superficialisation and inversion of aesthetics 
could also be called kitsch.
It should be noted here that the concepts of beauty, goodness and truth, and especially their interplay, 
cannot be separated from experiences of suffering and therefore from theodicy. It is my contention that 
theological kitsch comes to the foreground exactly when beauty, goodness and truth are taken out of the 
framework of theodicy to produce (simulate) a type of theologia gloriae that does not, and indeed cannot, 
take the dimension of suffering seriously. This needs some further clarification: In the brilliant novel by 
Milan Kundera (1984), The unbearable lightness of being, one of the characters, Sabina, has an epiphany in 
which she discovers that the world is slowly but surely being robbed of aesthetics, up to the point where 
beauty will entirely disappear from the earth:
… she discovered that the transformation of music into noise was a planetary process by which mankind was 
entering the historical phase of total ugliness. The total ugliness to come had made itself felt first as omnipresent 
acoustical ugliness: cars, motorcycles, electric guitars, drills, loudspeakers, sirens. The omnipresence of visual 
ugliness would soon follow…. Before beauty disappears entirely from the earth, it will go on existing for a 
while by mistake. ‘Beauty by mistake’ – the final phase in the history of beauty. 
(Kundera 1984:93, 101)
The discrepancy between life as ‘lightness of being’ and suffering as ‘unbearable’ compels Sabina to 
become sensitised for the process of omnipresent ‘uglification’. This resonates with what the renowned 
philosopher Richard Kearny (1988:3) postulated: whilst Western civilisation is experiencing a boom in 
1.To name but a few sources: Mennekes (1990, 1998); Dillenberger (1986, 1999); Thiessen (1999, 2001); Van Erp (2003) and Hacking 
(2005). Schmidt (2004:385) articulates this analogy between art and theology as follows: ‘Kunst wie Religion sind damit Ausdruck von 
und Dialog über Erfahrung. Sie setzen in Bewegung. Und sie weisen über sich hinaus, sie verweisen auf etwas jenseits der unmittelbaren 
Erfahrung…. Beiden, Kunst wie Religion kommt eine kairologisch-diagnostische wie eine kritisch-prophetische Bedeutung zu’.
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global communication, creativity as such is being endangered; 
while we are surrounded by images, imagination is dying out. 
Aesthetics – beauty, goodness and truth – seems to be under 
threat, seems to be in the process of being replaced (or rather: 
simulated) by kitsch.
From a theological viewpoint, I prefer to refer to this process 
not as uglification but rather as kitschification or plastification. In 
his monumental work On beauty, Umberto Eco (2004:72–85)  has 
pointed out that ‘ugliness’ or ‘monstrosity’ has always been 
part and parcel of at least Western art. The notion of ugliness 
therefore does not (necessarily) oppose aesthetics. The popular 
television series Ugly Betty might be a case in point. While 
the main character, Ugly Betty, is depicted as the unattractive 
one in terms of outward appearances, in comparison with the 
glamorous people of the fashion world, she turns out to be the 
only one with compassion, the only one truly human. Only she 
truly understands (real) life. In effect, she becomes the attractive 
one, becomes Beautiful Betty. She becomes an inverted metaphor 
for ‘as if’: it is ‘as if’ she is ugly – but she is not!
This link between beauty and ugliness, however, goes deeper 
than Hollywood and is, in fact, of theological importance. The 
cross of Christ was ‘ugly’, and yet it embodies the strange 
‘aesthetics’ of God. It has its own scandalous ‘beauty’. It 
underlines the fact that that which we deem ‘ugly’ could in fact 
be ‘beautiful’. This means that the Gospel of the (ugly) cross does 
not shrink away from the ugliness of life, does not gloss over it 
and does not try to dish up a sanitised version of it. Kitsch does 
exactly that. But the cross is not kitsch. Unfortunately, however, 
the cross can be kitschified, can be swept along in theological and 
liturgical strands that sentimentalise and sugarcoat it.
A relevant question for this article would therefore then be; To 
what extent, if any, has liturgy fallen prey to this upsurge of 
‘plastification’, this lure of kitsch? It would indeed seem as if 
the primary threats facing liturgy are not only fundamentalism 
or postmodernism or secularisation or privatisation (cf. Pieterse 
2008:1–8) but also plastification – a loss of aesthetics. With 
plastification an ideal of ‘beauty’ is held forth that is superficial 
and, in effect, inhuman. It becomes life-under-cosmetics, plaster 
of Paris existence, falsification with the pretence of originality. 
This process could also be called simulation.
KITSCH: SIMULATION OF BEAUTY, 
GOODNESS AND TRUTH?
If it is difficult to describe aesthetics and art, even more so is 
kitsch. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Kitsch also.
The word kitsch or kitch probably stems from a German word 
from the middle of the 19th century, with its trend towards 
sentimentality, from where it spread to almost all Western 
languages. It could mean ‘trash’ or perhaps rather denotes a so-
called (simulated; as-if!) ‘aesthetical’ ideal to cleanse and sanitise 
life from all that smacks of suffering. The German expression 
etwas verkitschen means to ‘knock something off’, to shatter it. 
That which is good is knocked over, fragmented, spoiled under 
the illusion that the substitute is (still, or only now) the ‘real 
thing’. In effect the ‘real thing’, or original, is perverted.
In the art world kitsch denotes works that are pretentious and 
inferior or in bad taste or merely vulgar. It is art that falls prey to 
the dictatorship of the populus and therefore to popular appeal. 
The notion of kitsch is traditionally also used in terms of a variety 
of other fields, such as literature, film and fashion. It usually 
applies to cheap works produced for the mass market, such as 
those found in souvenir shops and chain stores. Kitsch often 
denotes objects of such bad taste that they are actually ‘good’ 
in an ironic way, which explains the many collectors of good 
(bad) kitsch. Collecting kitsch has, in fact, become a booming 
‘art’ in itself!
It remains a subjective exercise when it comes to the discernment 
of kitsch. While many people would, for instance, describe the 
painting The lost orchid by Tretchikoff as pure kitsch, thousands 
and even millions might not share this opinion and might 
proudly display prints of this in their homes.
The art of Tretchikoff, in fact, offers an interesting insight into 
what is understood as kitsch. Perhaps one could say that The lost 
orchid, for instance, does not constitute kitsch as such (at least 
in the eye of some beholders!). As a matter of fact, this painting 
could be seen as not offering a sugarcoated version of (the party 
of) life. The after-effects of the party are visible: the streamers, 
the smoked cigarette, the trampled, lost orchid. The orchid has 
fulfilled its purpose and now lies on a dirty pair of steps and, in 
fact, weeps her last water drops. This is life after the party, naked 
and unveiled. 
But the kitschification of this art comes in with its transformation 
into a mass product, reproduced endlessly to find its place in 
the homes of masses. The copying and commercialisation of 
artworks like these often take place up to the point where people 
again long for the ‘original’, perhaps exemplified by the fact that 
this specific depiction of The lost orchid was sold for millions of 
rands but, at the same time, debunked by many art critics as a 
(very clever) falsification of the original! Perhaps this could even 
be called a double process of kitschification: it is a ‘genuine copy’ 
of the ‘original; – or not!?
Generally art that falls into the category of kitsch may claim to 
have an aesthetic purpose but, in fact, is tawdry and mediocre. It is, 
in terms of what we said above, an inverted and simulated form 
of aesthetics that tries to wear the masks of beauty, goodness 
and truth. Herein lies the essence of kitsch: it presents itself ‘as if’ 
it is the original but, in fact, denies it. It sidesteps all that is truly 
human, sugarcoating it in a halo of sentimentalism. As a matter 
of fact, when kitsch flourishes, sentimentalism spurts forth like 
a fountain. 
Nobody describes this sentimentalistic core of kitsch better than 
Milan Kundera (1984) in his The unbearable lightness of being: 
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear 
says: How nice to see children running on the grass! The second 
tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by 
children running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes 
kitsch kitsch. 
(Kundera 1984:251)
And even more directly, 
... kitsch is the absolute denial of shit, in both the literal and 
figurative senses of the word; kitsch excludes everything from its 
purview which is essentially unacceptable in human existence
 (Kundera 1984:248)
And perhaps most revealing, ‘... kitsch is a folding screen set up 
to curtain off death’ (Kundera 1984:253).
With these insights Kundera has, in fact, captured the essence 
of theological (theologia gloriae) kitsch: it acts ‘as if’ death is not 
deadly. It veils death, as it veils the search for meaning amidst 
the suffering of life. The theology of the resurrection, on the 
contrary, accepts the deadliness of death completely and totally. 
It does not try to veil or conceal it but says, directly in the 
(unveiled) face of this deadliness, Where is your sting? (cf. 1 Cor 
15:55).
Perhaps a workable definition of kitsch at this point would 
be the reduction or inversion of aesthetic objects or ideas into easily 
marketable forms. Some postmodern thinkers are of the opinion 
that the kitschification of culture is but one symptom of the 
postmodern condition. Jean Baudrillard (1998) describes kitsch 
as follows: 
The kitsch object is commonly understood as one of that great army 
of ‘trashy’ objects, made of plaster of Paris or some such imitation 
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material: that gallery of cheap junk accessories, folksy knickknacks, 
‘souvenirs’, lampshades or fake African masks which proliferate 
everywhere, with a preference for holiday resorts and places of 
leisure. 
(Baudrillard 1998:109−110)
Baudrillard (1998) goes on: 
To the aesthetics of beauty and originality, kitsch opposes its 
‘aesthetics of simulation’: it everywhere reproduces objects smaller 
or larger than life; it imitates materials (in plaster, plastic, etc.); 
it apes forms or combines them discordantly; ‘it repeats fashion’ 
without having been part of the experience of fashion. 
(Baudrillard 1998:111)
Of importance here are the phrases aesthetics of simulation and 
repetition of fashion. In my opinion, these two key concepts of 
simulation and repetition bring us closer to the heart of the 
matter. Other key concepts would be the tendency to simplify 
and trivialise complex ideas by reducing them to stereotypes. It is 
furthermore clear that kitsch is oriented towards the masses and 
therefore tends towards the lowest common denominator to which 
all and sundry can relate; it is geared towards mass consumption 
and thus to profit-making entertainment. Or, again in the words of 
Baudrillard (1998), 
This proliferation of kitsch, which is produced by industrial 
reproduction and the vulgarisation at the level of objects of 
distinctive signs taken from all registers (the bygone, the ‘neo’, 
the exotic, the folksy, the futuristic) and from a disordered excess 
of ‘ready-made’ signs, has its basis, like ‘mass culture’, in the 
sociological reality of the consumer society. 
(Baudrillard 1998:110)
This tendency towards mass consumerism also implies that 
kitsch normally operates without any political or critical edge.
It would be interesting to ask what the relationship between 
kitsch and morality is. If kitsch, in fact, simulates and repeats 
up to the point where the simulation and repetition is seen as 
the ‘original’, does this not constitute aesthetical corruption? Is it 
not a form of unethical aesthetics? Should there be a connection 
between aesthetics and ethics? These questions cannot be 
addressed in extenso in this article. A few comments from a 
liturgical viewpoint might, however, be helpful.
Whilst many theologians have written extensively on the 
relationship between aesthetics and theology (and liturgy in 
particular),2 those giving attention to the phenomenon of kitsch, 
and its effects on theology and liturgy, seem to be extremely 
scarce. In order to do this, to reflect on the impact of kitsch on 
liturgy, we need to revisit our ‘definition’ of (religious) aesthetics 
in terms of beauty, goodness and truth.
 
LITURGY AND THE LURE OF KITSCH
Kitsch as simulated ‘beauty’
In 2 Corinthians 3:13–16 Paul writes about the act of veiling 
and unveiling. He refers to Exodus 34:33–35 where Moses put 
a veil (kalymma) over his face because the Israelites feared the 
divine radiance that came from it. Paul, however, reinterprets 
this event to mean that Moses put on the veil so that the Israelites 
might not see the end of the temporary radiance. Paul then 
contrasts the passing glory (doxa) of the old covenant with the 
eternal glory of the new (verse 11). While the veil may not be 
lifted for many because of their disobedience to the Gospel, for 
Christian believers the veil has been lifted and they now see the 
light of the Gospel of the glory of Christ (2 Cor 4:4, 6; cf. Mundle 
1976:213). We now look at life through the eyes of the Gospel. 
Liturgy celebrates, inter alia, this unveiling of life. Because the veil 
has been taken away by Christ, we can discern God’s revelation, 
2.A classic source in this regard still remains Guardini’s work (1997). In the European 
context people like Barnard (2004) and Meyer-Blanck (2005) have debated this 
issue. It would seem as if this link between aesthetics and liturgy comes more 
naturally (corporally) in the African-American context (cf. McGann 2002).
or again in terms of our definition, we gain (aesthetical) insight 
into and liturgically celebrate God’s beauty, goodness and truth 
in this world.
Religious kitsch, on the contrary, being a phenomenon of veiling 
in its very essence, does not discern the beauty, in other words 
the coming and presence, of God within the realities of this life. 
This coming and presence (beauty) of God, or what Harries 
(1993:36) has called ‘the glimmerings of eternal light, flames or 
flashes of divine beauty’, is perverted into sentimental jargon; 
it is transformed into ‘the pretty, the merely decorative, or the 
inoffensively pleasant’ (Hart 2003:15). But the intention of this 
revealed beauty of God is more than merely evoking a sentimental 
feeling about pretty sunsets, artistic flower arrangements or 
snow-covered mountain tops. Beauty is all about the will of 
God and his intention with his creation, namely sjalom and 
wholesomeness (cf. Cilliers 2007:50). Therefore, the beauty of 
God includes the ‘ugliness’ of the cross, which represents the 
strange ‘beauty’ of God, par excellence (cf. Evdokimov 1990:309 f).
Religious kitsch changes God’s beauty into sentimentality. The 
key concepts of Baudrillard again come to mind: the ‘beauty’ of 
the cross is funnelled through the demand of marketable form, 
in order to attain the largest common denominator, in order to 
achieve the highest profit-making entertainment. In the process, 
the crux of the cross is kitschified. One need not look far for such 
liturgical kitschifications: in many worship services the angels 
no longer cry out ‘Holy, Holy, Holy – but rather Nice, Nice, 
Nice!’ (cf. Tisdale 2001:182). A kitschified cross no longer drips 
blood but honey, no longer embodies pain but plastic, no longer 
mediates salvation but sentiment.
God is transformed into a principle that sounds ‘correct’, 
especially religious, and this principle is used as a guarantee 
for human excellence, in other words for the achievements of 
a ‘theology of success’. This is such a radical vulgarisation of 
the Gospel that we should perhaps join in the seemingly harsh 
critique of Bohren (1979:155) (one of the few who reflected 
theologically on the phenomenon of kitsch) when he states 
that religious kitsch does not understand the judgment of God 
and therefore cannot express the grace of God. The irony is 
that through this domestication of God, religious kitsch itself 
becomes an expression of God’s judgment. If a church is ruled 
by King Kitsch, this church stands under God’s judgment.
Kitsch as simulated ‘goodness’
Religious kitsch does not understand the meaning of God’s 
revealed goodness, in other words healing grace. It overestimates 
humanity’s potential for self-generated healing and therefore 
loses out on grace. It does not understand the concept of being a 
creature of God while at the same time being a beggar in need of 
grace (Luther). Grace is cheapened and perverted and becomes 
just another tool in our so-called ‘pursuit of happiness’. What do 
we mean by this?
Again, Baudrillard (1998:111) comes to our aid when he states 
that kitsch ‘… repeats fashion without having been part of the 
experience of fashion’. Liturgical kitsch talks about God’s grace 
without understanding an iota of it. It endeavours to simulate, 
to duplicate, but it cannot present the ‘original’ because it 
never was or never became part of it. But if liturgy no longer 
understands the uniqueness of grace but rather focuses on that 
which works as ‘self-help’ or is popular according to the taste 
of the day, religious kitsch surges forward and is characterised 
by overflowing ‘descriptions’ of worship, in other words grace 
instead of experiencing worship and grace itself. 
Liturgical language and rituals then no longer express 
something elementary but rather talk and preach ‘about’ 
something. The performance (graceful effect) of the Gospel then 
becomes the ‘performance’ of religious speech. Indeed, when 
the ‘performance’ of the liturgist is of such a quality that the 
HTS 
H
TS
 T
eo
lo
gi
es
e 
S
tu
di
es
/T
he
ol
og
ic
al
 S
tu
di
es
   
http://www.hts.org.za
Original Research
A
rt
ic
le
 #
81
5
(page number not for citation purposes)
Cilliers
4 Vol. 66    No. 2     Page 4 of 5
speaker becomes a mere observer, standing outside the event, 
kitsch reigns supreme. These kinds of observer, in fact, do not 
observe God, the living God, because they stand outside the 
engagement with this God. They are rather in harmony with the 
fashion of the day, with its disordered excess of ‘ready-made’ signs 
(Baudrillard 1998:110); they are tuned into the illusion of a ‘do-
it-yourself society’.
Again, this simulation of goodness might seem appropriate, 
even (religiously) correct, but it is wrong. It does not understand 
that the scandal of the cross unveils the kitsch of self-help 
techniques. Ultimately, these techniques transform (simulates) 
God’s goodness (grace) into moral domestications.
Kitsch as simulated ‘truth’
Kitsch cannot endure life’s struggles. It avoids theodicy like the 
plague. It cannot exist in the tension of the quest for meaning. 
It rather becomes a type of souvenir kitsch, souvenir faith: like 
sentimental figurines and artefacts it bypasses reality, also the 
reality of suffering, poverty and being truly human. It is, to 
quote Kundera (1984:248, 253) again, in absolute denial of the 
shit of life and sets up its folding screen to curtain off death. It 
cannot look at the ugly beauty of the cross.  
African kitsch (decorated tribal drums, figures embraced in 
‘ubuntu’, neatly woven beads, etc.), although providing food 
on the table for many an entrepreneur, can also blind one to 
the realities of Africa: realities of poverty, HIV/AIDS and 
corruption. 
[Indeed, the] great army of ‘trashy’ objects, made of plaster of 
Paris or some such imitation material: that gallery of cheap junk 
accessories, folksy knickknacks, ‘souvenirs’, lampshades or fake 
African masks which proliferate everywhere, with a preference 
for holiday resorts and places of leisure [can create the illusion of 
blissful life, but under this surface reality suffers]. 
 (Baudrillard 1998:109–110) 
Kitsch cannot face the truth. This is also the way in which 
religious (and liturgical) kitsch operates. It views life through 
rosy lenses. It bypasses the truth of reality and rather operates 
like souvenir stalls on tourist routes. Religious and liturgical 
kitsch indeed has no political or critical edge: it excels in 
acquiescence, not in disrupting the status quo. It cannot face the 
truth and will not speak the truth. When it does speak it may 
once again sound correct but, in fact, is wrong.
Because kitsch, also in its liturgical form, constitutes the 
hallmarks of sensationalism and entertainment and speaks the 
language of the fashionable, using the jargon of the masses to 
full effect, it does not understand the need for lament. It has 
no inclination towards taking obedience (the Torah) into the 
rhythms of everyday experiences, also those that call for lament. 
Liturgical kitsch knows nothing about the real struggles of life; 
theologically speaking, it has domesticated – plastified – eschatology 
(cf. Cilliers 2008:26–28). Indeed, for kitsch domestication is 
everything, making everything harmless, especially God. Truth 
is generalised, robbed of it sharp edge. The harsh judgment of 
Bohren (1979:156) once again seems appropriate: ‘Kitsch is an 
expression of faith that bypasses truth. It is practiced heresy, 
manifestation of a falsified gospel, the embodiment of lying’. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF KITSCH 
How does kitsch achieve this inversion of beauty, truth 
and goodness? The keyword is indeed simulation. Kitsch as 
simulation has certain characteristics. I briefly refer to five.
Firstly, endless repetition (which should be distinguished from 
relevant and functional repetition) is implemented to create the 
illusion that this representation (of beauty, goodness and truth) 
is the ultimate reality. In this manner, reality is kitschified and 
thus falsified. On a linguistic and rhetorical level, kitsch indeed 
often manifests itself as meaningless repetitions and accumulations 
in a fruitless attempt to achieve ‘effect’. The word alone is not 
trusted; therefore, words must be repeated endlessly. 
Secondly, still on a linguistic and rhetorical level, kitsch does 
not understand the art of finding fitting images/metaphors/parables, 
often simply stringing them together, not understanding the 
power of a single, strong metaphor. Thus it creates subtexts, 
distracting from the (simple) word or Word. It intends to create 
effect through a multitude of images but, in effect, ends up 
by pulling the senses apart (cf. Cilliers 2008:27–28). It shatters 
(verkitschen) that which should have been simple, should have 
been claritas scripturae.
Thirdly, kitsch is masterful in the aping of forms or discordant 
combination of them. By this kind of liturgical kitsch I mean 
an unnuanced and theologically irresponsible adding and 
subtracting (‘cut and paste’) of elements to and from the 
liturgical repertoire. Symbols and rituals are introduced, left 
out, shattered and fragmented without taking cognisance of 
the theological context, motivations, historical setting and 
theological and anthropological issues being put on the table 
via these activities (Wepener & Müller 2001:482, 489). Liturgical 
kitsch, in fact, thrives on these dynamics of clinical repetition; it 
is cut-and-paste liturgy par excellence.
Fourthly, kitsch simplifies and trivialises complex ideas by reducing 
them to stereotypes. It in fact oversimplifies life, glossing over 
paradoxes and therefore also flattens out the hard edges of 
Scripture, trivialising and domesticating it (cf. Brueggemann 
1989:7). In the process it becomes untrue and unfaithful to life, 
handing out recipes and how-to-do-it’s instead of wisdom and 
discernment. Baudrillard’s (1998:111) comments again come 
back to haunt us: kitsch reproduces objects smaller or larger than 
life. It betrays reality. 
Fithly, it is therefore no wonder that kitsch excels in both 
superlatives and diminutives, linguistic structures that, in fact, 
create realities ‘smaller or larger than life’. Kitsch loves to 
use diminutives (‘Dear congregation, the Gospel has the 
answer to all out little daily worries .…’) or superlatives (life 
is absolutely ‘wonderful’), which inevitably leads to loss of true 
contextualisation: reality is simply not like that. For kitsch, faith is 
either about the ‘little Lord Jesus who lays down his sweet head’ 
or the ‘phenomenal and glorious manifestation of God’s glory’. 
It only loves the little Lord Jesus because ‘no tears He does make’ 
and who becomes the cute and cuddly Christ of kitsch. Or it only 
embraces the glorious and grand revelations of the great God, 
revelations that lift us up and above the mundane. In between, 
in die monotony and sufferings of life, kitsch finds no foothold. 
The use of diminutives and superlatives is often accompanied 
by the excessive implementation of adjectives and tautologies, 
perhaps because there is, in fact, a deep uncertainty about the 
reality of the little Lord Jesus or the possibility of the glorious 
manifestation of God’s glory and an unconscious need to 
boost this confession. Of course, one could object and say that 
this is overkill in interpretation on our part and that the use of 
adjectives like these is harmless. But that is exactly the point: 
in this case it makes the Christmas event harmless, unreal, and 
creates a false awareness that pushes the Christmas event into 
sentimental realms (cf. Bohren 1979:150–151). It widens the gap 
between what is perceived as the (unreal?) ‘manifestation of 
God’ and his (real?) presence in the monotony and sufferings 
of our existence.
In short, kitsch does not, in fact cannot, understand the presence 
of God (his beauty, goodness and truth) within the realities of 
life. Therefore, it cannot fathom the ugly beauty of the cross.
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